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Abstract 
 
Conventional theory suggests that the level of political violence a state 
experiences in protest directly correlates to the government structure of the state; this 
school of thought expects liberal democracies to be relatively peaceful while 
authoritarian states are expected to have high levels of violence. This study aims to 
counter this belief and instead explores the relationship that socialization and the political 
culture of a state have on political violence. Using comparative analyses of four case 
studies – looking at Iran, the United States, France, and Russia within these cases – my 
research tests models created for this thesis that allow for observations to be made about 
political violence. My results indicate that neither socialization, political culture, nor the 
government structure of a state can be solely linked to the level of political violence in a 
state. Rather, it is a combination of all these elements and much more. 
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 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Public protest is a social phenomenon that can be found in every state.  All 
peoples, to one degree or another and one issue to another, have something to gripe 
about.  Yet protests vary from one country to the next – in some countries it happens 
frequently and often takes a violent turn, while in other countries it is atypical and rarely, 
if ever, turns violent. The disparities in the level of violence across states is popularly 
correlated to regime structure. However, this is an explanation that I, alongside other 
scholars in the field, find unsatisfying. Perhaps, instead, the level of violence within a 
state’s public protest can be linked to the unique political culture within the state. The 
study of political culture is not a new field of study, but its relation to disparate violence 
levels is a lesser developed field that my research will help expand upon. 
Furthermore, the persistence of political protest, and the dangerous violence it can 
produce, proves the necessity for further research on the topic. Just this past year, protests 
have begun in Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Netherlands, France, the United States, and 
countless others.1  This is an issue that is worldwide and yet we know very little about 
why these protests evolve the way they do. A large part of this is due to a lack of 
understanding why protests turn violent, or stay peaceful, and why they vary so 
drastically from state to state. Political violence within public protests can take a number 
of forms ranging from the throwing of milkshakes or eggs to the use of Molotov cocktails 
and the destruction of public property. Often these typologies are tied to states, but not 
often are they tied to a regime typology, meaning that discrepancies persist amongst 
 
1 Juliana Kapland and Allana Akhtar, “A World on Fire: Here Are All the Major Protests 
Happening Around the Globe Right Now,” Business Insider, October 22, 2019, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/all-the-protests-around-the-world-right-now.  
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liberal democracies as a group as well as amongst authoritarian states as a group. This 
lack of uniformity suggests there must be some other explanation, or variable, that has yet 
to be produced. Thus, there exists a strong gap in theorizing that fails to explain these 
variances and our understanding of political violence suffers as a result. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 The aim of this research is to fill the gap in comparative politics theory that exists 
regarding how we understand disparate political violence across states. The importance of 
this research, however, comes more so in its application and the way I hope to connect 
leading theories in this field. My research and literature review are largely built upon the 
works of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture  and Ted Gurr’s Why 
Men Rebel.2 These scholars have each presented their own arguments, Almond and Verba 
on political culture and Gurr on political violence, with each producing their own 
findings and models. My research hopes to build on this scholarship by creating a new set 
of models that link the ideas presented by these leading scholars in these two texts. With 
the creation of these new models, I will be able to conduct my own tests and make my 
own findings. My case studies within this research will be dated back twenty years, with 
my analyses of protests being predominantly built off of protests coming after the year 
2000. The primary goal of these tests is to ascertain whether political culture correlates to 
the variance in degrees of violence in public protests across various states. 
The concepts I will turn to in my discussion of political culture and political 
violence stem from the research of prior scholars. These concepts are dense, and you 
 
2 Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations, [new ed.] (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989); Ted Robert Gurr, 
Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: published for the Center of International Studies by Princeton University 
Press, 1970). 
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would be hard pressed to find reading as dry as some chapters in these texts. 
Nevertheless, the models they produce have proven invaluable in my own research and 
serve as the basis for my own models and argument. Further discussion of these models 
will take place within the literature review, but I find it important to stress that my 
models serve to connect these loosely related fields into a more unified study. Whereas 
some past scholars have observed disparities in levels of political violence, it is of my 
understanding that none have connected the concepts of political culture and political 
violence the way I have in this thesis. Using the models for types of political culture 
found within Political Culture, I will connect the theories of political violence found 
within Gurr’s Why Men Rebel to produce new models capable of testing correlations 
between political culture and disparate political violence. My case studies make use of 
these models and allow me to test four distinct hypotheses that will answer the research 
questions my thesis is built upon. 
1.3 Research Questions: 
1. Does a correlation exist between the political culture of a state and the level of 
political violence found within said state? 
2. Does socialization, as an extension of political culture, explain disparate levels of 
political violence? 
3. Can the political structure of a state (authoritarian, liberal democracy, etc.) be 
used to determine the level of violence said state can expect in a protest? 
  
 4 
Literature Review 
 The terminology and concepts used in this research can be confusing, but these 
terms are essential to understanding my original research. Therefore, the literature review 
section of my thesis will be dedicated to exploring these terms and the theoretical 
precedent that my research is founded upon. I will analyze theoretical concepts around 
the terms public protest, political culture, and political violence as they are the main 
aspects of my research.  
Political Culture 
            Historically, theoretical understanding of political culture has been greatly shaped 
by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s famous book, The Civic Culture. Their text is a 
comparative analysis of political culture and a discussion of the relationships citizens 
have with their government as a result of their socialization within the state’s political 
system. Since the publication of The Civic Culture in 1963, a variety of scholars have 
offered their own understandings of political culture, all with subtle variations to the 
original works of Almond and Verba. To fully understand the term and to build up to the 
main theoretical work found in The Civic Culture, we will observe the origin of the term 
before discussing these external texts that add to this field of study. Chronologically, the 
modern understanding of the term arose through Gabriel Almond’s solo work in a 
political journal for Princeton University in 1956. His argument would go on to serve as 
the foundation for his later research with Verba and it explains the beginnings of the 
theoretical field, which has since grown exponentially. 
Almond’s brief research paper, “Comparative Political Systems,” aimed to 
expand contemporary notions of comparative analyses across states, an area of increasing 
interest in the United States due to growing expansion of U.S. involvement around the 
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world.3 In his text, Almond aimed to identify aspects of political systems that could be 
used in comparative studies. He discusses “orientation to political action” as a key aspect 
of understanding political systems and claims terms that typically describe these 
orientations, such as “attitudes towards politics” and “political values” are “diffuse and 
ambiguous.”4 Almond extends his argument further by suggesting his own interpretation 
of political culture, stating that as “every political system is embedded in a particular 
pattern of orientations to political action” it is “useful to refer to this as the political 
culture.”5 He stresses that this political culture is “not the same as general culture” as 
“political orientation involves cognition, intellection, and adaptation to external 
situations, as well as the standards and values of the general culture.”6 This early 
definition of political culture serves to explain political culture as a narrowed view of 
political systems that also explains how citizens are oriented to action within said 
systems.  
Almond would go on to develop The Civic Culture with Verba, thus creating the 
core concepts my thesis is built upon. However, it is equally important to view some of 
the ways that other scholars have interpreted political culture since its inception. Walter 
Rosenbaum divides the term into two distinctions that vary both in their application as 
well as with the level of political life that is being studied. When applying to the 
individual, Rosenbaum specifies that “political culture . . . [asks] what bonds exist 
between him and the essentials of his political system and how these bonds affect his 
 
3 Gabriel Almond, “Comparative Political Systems,” The Journal of Politics 18, no. 3 (August 
1956): 391. 
4 Ibid., 396. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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behavior.”7  However, Rosenbaum distinguishes his second interpretation of political 
culture as the “collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political 
system.”8 This emphasis on the collective is more interested in how large swathes of a 
population interact with their state. Rosenbaum’s views of political culture emphasize the 
many ways citizens engage with their government, both as individuals and as a collective; 
my research will view political violence as an example of the collective interaction 
through public protest.  
            Rosenbaum is not alone in his interpretation as countless other scholars have 
chimed in on this topic. This shows that a divide does still persist, with interpretations 
often deviating from The Civic Culture. Perhaps now, it is more appropriate to delve into 
this text, seeing that a basic set of definitions has been explored. Political culture within 
The Civic Culture “refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the 
system.”9 They speak to the capacity of their research by limiting it to a study of culture, 
but only insofar as it relates to the political orientation of society, an echo of what 
Almond said in his original journal article. A more encompassing definition comes from 
the statement that the “political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns 
of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.”10 This 
statement is the foundation of their models as they begin to explain the modes of political 
 
7 Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 4. 
8 Rosenbaum, Political Culture, 4. 
9 Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy 
in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 13.  
10 Ibid., 15. 
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orientation as well as the classes of political objects that citizens interact with which and 
that define political culture. 
Almond and Verba’s Models for Types of Political Orientation and Political Objects 
1. cognitive orientation: “knowledge of and belief about the political system, its 
roles, its inputs, and its outputs” 
2. affective orientation: “feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and 
performance” 
3. evaluational orientation: “the judgements and opinions about political objects that 
typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information 
and feelings”11 
These orientations were used by Almond and Verba to systematically map out an 
individual’s feelings towards his state, thus informing the political culture of the state. 
The orientations above were also used together to explore four distinct objects as shown 
in Figure 1, which comes directly from the text: 
Figure 1 
Dimensions of Political Orientation 
  
1. 
System as 
General Object 
2. 
Input Objects 
3. 
Output Objects 
4. 
Self as Object 
Cognition         
Affect         
Evaluation         
     
1. Summarized as the knowledge an individual has of his “nation and of his political 
system in general terms, its history, size, location, power” and his feelings 
towards those characteristics.12 These will be further discussed in the case studies 
later in my research, but it is important to further clarify this object of political 
 
11 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 15. 
12 Ibid., 17. 
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culture. The system as a general object can be viewed as how much a citizen 
understands about his nation in the grander scheme of global politics. As such, 
much of my research of a state’s involvement with this orientation looked to the 
civic education that said state prescribed to its citizens. 
2. Summarized as the knowledge an individual has “of the structures and roles, the 
various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward 
flow of policy making” and his feelings on these topics.13 This object can be 
further explained as the actions one takes to influence politics in a state 
preemptively. My research on this object for states often looked to voter turnouts 
or involvement with political parties to ascertain whether a state is oriented to it or 
not. 
3. Summarized as the knowledge an individual has “of the downward flow of policy 
enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these 
processes” and his feelings about these topics.14 This object, opposite to input 
objects, deals with the reactionary aspect of political involvement. My research on 
this object looked directly to the protests of a state, as this is the clearest way to 
see these reactionary forces. 
4. Summarized as the individual’s perception of “himself as a member of his 
political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, powers, obligations, and of 
strategies of access to influence.”15 Includes his feelings about his own 
capabilities and can be described as the way we view ourselves as a member of 
the political system. My research points to polls taken about citizen’s involvement 
with politics and the ability a citizen has to operate in a political system that is 
free from corruption to satisfy orientation to this object. 
Therefore, in order to characterize a nations political culture, you must fill in this 
graph for a valid sample of the population. This political culture becomes “the frequency 
of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17. 
15 Ibid. 
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system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor.”16 This 
shows how political culture is measured through the frequency of these orientations for 
each object; this frequency being observed through the cognitive, affective, and 
evaluative aspects discussed earlier. Almond and Verba would go on to build upon this 
information with a second table showing the three primary types of political culture their 
research discovered.  
Figure 2 
Types of Political Culture 
  
  
System as 
General Object 
  
Input Objects 
  
Output Objects 
  
Self as Object 
Parochial 0 0 0 0 
Subject 1 0 1 0 
Participant 1 1 1 1 
  
Parochial Political Culture: This form of political culture occurs when “the 
frequency of orientations to specialized political objects of the four kinds specified in 
Figure 1 approaches zero.”17 Parochial cultures most commonly align with communities 
resembling African tribal societies in that they have “no specialized political roles” and 
that the “parochial expects nothing from the political system.”18 Here political 
responsibility is nigh non-existent. 
Subject Political Culture: This form of political culture has a “high frequency of 
orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17. 
18 Ibid., 18. 
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system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active 
participant approach zero.”19 Here the individual “is aware of specialized governmental 
authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; 
and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not.”20 This breeds a more passive 
relationship as only the output of the political system is engaged with. My expectation of 
states that have a subject system is that they would refrain from higher levels of violence, 
as a result of their laissez faire attitude toward politics. Subject citizens would choose 
output methods like protests in their interactions with the politics of their state, rather 
than becoming heavily involved with every aspect of the political system they have little 
regard for. 
Participant Political Culture: This third type of political culture “is one in which 
the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to 
both the political and administrative structures and processes: in other words, to both the 
input and output aspects of the political system.”21 This culture breeds individuals who 
tend “to be oriented toward an ‘activist’ role of the self in the polity” and reflect that 
through their consistent involvement in all aspects of the system.22 My research expects 
participant states to be more active in politics, perhaps being more influenced by 
socialization aspects of the state as a result, something that will be further discussed in 
the next section of my literature review. 
 
19 Ibid., 19. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.  
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A point should be stressed in understanding these topics that this classification of 
a state’s system “does not imply homogeneity or uniformity of political cultures.”23 
Almond and Verba stress that while these cultures may be dominant in a state and visible 
through the individuals who subscribe to this dominant culture, other subcultures may 
still exist. In a participant society, there may exist some parochial and subject individuals 
who are still produced, as a result of “imperfections of the processes of political 
socialization.”24 For Almond and Verba’s research, they use these models to develop an 
understanding of Civic Culture, which they define as a “particular mix of citizens, 
subjects, and parochials.”25 This, “citizen,” is described as “a particular mix of 
participant, subject, and parochial orientations.”26 The goal of their research is to further 
develop these systems and understand how the “civic culture” can be achieved; which 
they classify as being the most perfect form of political culture.  
Furthermore, parochial, participatory and subject cultures are not beholden to any 
set regime structure. Although they may be more easily linked to certain styles, it is the 
orientation of the citizens of state that determines the political culture. The four objects 
listed in the tables – system as a general object, input objects, output objects, and the self 
as an object – are the determinates for political culture and depend solely upon how the 
citizens themselves orient toward these objects. In the case of my own research, which 
will forego the study of parochial systems, it is important to view this for a participant 
and subject system. In the case of a participant system it must be understood that an 
authoritarian or liberal democracy could host said system. The same must be understood 
 
23 Ibid., 20. 
24 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 20. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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for a subject system as participation and understandings of political culture vary amongst 
groupings of authoritarian and liberal democracies. These systems provide us the lens to 
view socialization of a state through, but they cannot be held accountable to a certain 
regime style. The following section on my methodology will detail how I will use these 
models for my own research as I look to the political violence found in each system.  
Political Violence 
            The goal of this thesis is to explore political culture and to discern whether it can 
be used to explain disparate levels of political violence across states. Political violence, 
however, is a very broad term that is applicable across many different fields of research. 
To narrow our understanding of this term – and to enlighten those who may be unfamiliar 
– this section will discuss the definition, typologies, and common theories of political 
violence before turning to the chief text that will be used for my own research. In 
defining political violence, we must first ensure it is viewed fairly and in a favorable 
perspective, in order to understand the term as it is viewed in the comparative politics and 
international relations subfields of political science. H. L. Nieburg states in Political 
Violence that “extreme and violent political behavior cannot be dismissed as erratic, 
exceptional, and meaningless.”27 He argues that by dismissing political violence as a 
viable source of political action, we “deny the role of violence in creating and testing 
political legitimacy and in conditioning the terms of all social bargaining and 
adjustments.”28 Already, a definition is beginning to form here that looks at political 
violence as a means of understanding the legitimacy of a state by violently challenging 
the states authority as a collective. 
 
27 H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process (New York: St. Martin’s, 1969), 5. 
28 Ibid. 
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            For Nieburg, political violence is a legitimate means by which people interact 
with the state. Rather than dismissing these violent acts altogether as meaningless 
dissidence, he argues that “violent acts may be looked upon as society’s early warning 
system, revealing deep-rooted political conflicts which are gathering strength beneath the 
surface of social relations.”29 The very presence of this violence within a state points to 
underlying feelings of dissatisfaction that leads to mass political dissent. Viewing these 
actions as legitimate is critical in my research as public protestors who resort to violence 
must also be seen as legitimate actors. The variance in political violence between states 
who undergo protests cannot be used as a means to rule certain public protests as 
illegitimate over others. 
            Nieburg defines political violence as “acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose 
purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or 
effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a 
bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system.”30 This definition 
concisely narrows our focus to only those acts that are politically charged in an effort to 
differentiate this form of violence from common interpretations of the word. However, 
this term still has far reaching and broad applications within the political realm that 
ultimately weaken the definition. Acts of individuals, such as assassinations, can still be 
politically charged actions and they are most certainly violent in nature. Furthermore, 
political ties can be vaguely assigned to groups such as the KKK, despite their being 
known to have ulterior, racial issues driving their organization. When we view the violent 
acts of groups like this, we cannot skirt the responsibilities of discerning the presence of a 
 
29 Nieburg, Political Violence, 7. 
30 Ibid., 13. 
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hate crime by hiding the institution behind their political ties. I believe the same can be 
said about defining acts of true political violence. Therefore, while Nieburg provides a 
solid ground for understanding political violence, it does not satisfy the needs of my 
research and shows the need for understanding the typologies of political violence. 
            To examine the typologies of political violence, my research brought me to an 
article in Social and Economic Studies by Perry Mars, which analyzed the nature of 
political violence. Mars aimed to find clarity in the term as he mentioned that “there is a 
general lack of consensus among political theorists about the precise nature of political 
violence,”31 something I strongly echo in my own analysis. However, the article still 
manages to hone in on a strong list of typologies for political violence. The list below, 
which Perry developed using the work of political scientists R. J. Rummel and Raymond 
Tanter,32 serves my research by listing typologies pertinent to the exclusively internal 
political violence of a state. As my research looks to political protests, which almost 
exclusively operate within a state, I found this research most useful in my own study. 
General Strike: General strikes are defined as being “aimed against governmental 
authority or policy and involving at least 1,000 workers.”33 
Guerrilla War: A guerrilla war is classified as “armed activity of irregular forces 
aimed at overthrow of the existing government.”34 This is a more large-scale 
movement likely involving direct and large-scale attacks on the established 
regime. 
 
31 Perry Mars, “The Nature of Political Violence,” Social and Economic Studies 24, no. 2 (1975): 
221. 
32 Rudolf J. Rummel, “Dimensions of Foreign and Domestic Conflict Behavior: A Review of 
Empirical Findings,” in Theory and Research on the Causes of War, ed. Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. 
Snyder (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 219–28; Raymond Tanter, “Dimensions of Conflict 
Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1950–60,” Conflict Resolution 10, no. 1 (1966): 42–64. 
33 Mars, “Nature of Political Violence,” 229. 
34 Ibid. 
 15 
Major Government Crisis: Major government crises are situations “threatening 
the downfall of the regime; evidenced by declaration of martial law, suspension or 
abrogation of the Constitution, etc.”35  
Purge: A purge is a “systematic elimination of opposition by the political elite – 
jailing or execution, arrests, etc.”36  
Riot: A riot is classified as a “violent demonstration or clash of citizens involving 
at least 100 people.”37  
Anti-Government Demonstration: These demonstrations are “unorganized, 
peaceful, public gathering[s] involving at least 100 people for the purpose of 
displaying or voicing opposition to government policies or authority.”38  
Revolution: A revolution is defined as an “armed successful or unsuccessful 
attempt to form an independent government involving pitched battles between 
opposing forces on a grand scale.”39  
            These terms serve to distinguish types of violence, yet they lack specifics on the 
levels of violence within these movements. Furthermore, the events are more classified 
by size and role, rather than the level of violence they experience specifically. While my 
research primarily focusses on just the riot and anti-government demonstration 
definitions above, I still feel these lack clarity. My thesis, and more specifically the 
methodology section of my research, will serve to craft more distinguishable levels of 
violence that will build upon these definitions of protest. 
            Theories surrounding political violence are plentiful in the comparative politics 
and international relations fields, perhaps a result of the variations in definitions and 
multitudes of typologies. Nieburg takes us through a few of these theories that can help 
 
35 Mars, “Nature of Political Violence,” 229. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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us to understand the importance of political violence and contemporary thoughts that 
scholars have on the topic. One such theory, listed as the “Riffraff and Reds” theory, 
bears the “notion that Communists or ‘outside agitators’ with links to Hanoi, Peking, 
Havana, if not Moscow, are behind every serious act of disruption and collision.”40 This 
theory doesn’t suggest that every act of political violence begins with these actors, but it 
suggests that they agitate or expand the act if they were not the root cause. This theory 
explains the root of this violence further by stating that “spontaneous contagion enables 
incorrigible mischief-makers and no-gooders to unleash uncontrolled escalations, 
sweeping responsible and law-abiding citizens into a vortex of violence.”41 From this 
perspective, it is the riffraff of society that is riled up by outside influencers that pushes a 
larger group of more mild-mannered citizens to act violently. 
            Another prominent theory is the “McLuhan Thesis” which argues that “electronic 
communications are transforming and "retribalizing" society, inducing a new immediacy 
of human contact and a violent revolution of individual consciousness.”42 This theory 
looks at the evolution of political violence through the evolution of media, as dissenters 
adapt their actions to the medium that portrays them. Another theory, dubbed the “Return 
of the Killer Instinct,” suggests that “social institutions must vent, repress, and contain 
[societies] fixed dosage of murderous potential.”43 The fear being that if left unchecked 
by the state, “the gleeful, blood-thirsty caveman in each of us breaks out in search of a 
target or victim.”44 This theory resorts to an extended look at Social Darwinism, again 
 
40 Nieburg, Political Violence, 18. 
41 Ibid., 20. 
42 Ibid., 26. 
43 Ibid., 36. 
44 Ibid. 
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showing the extraordinary range present in political violence theory. Unfortunately, none 
of these theories, nor the work of Nieburg himself, will be used to support my own 
research. Instead, my thesis uses the work of political theorist, Ted Robert Gurr, and his 
book, Why Men Rebel.45 
            Gurr presents his own interpretation of political violence as being defined as “all 
collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – 
including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies.”46 He also 
introduces the typologies that he would discuss, listing them as “revolution . . . guerrilla 
wars, coups d’état, rebellions, and riots,” thus far bearing a strong resemblance to the 
prior definitions and typologies discussed in Nieburg and Mars’ texts.47 The distinction 
that Gurr makes, however, is in his classification of the levels of political violence; these 
classifications include turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war, but in reading through his 
text I isolated turmoil as the most relatable to my own research. Turmoil is defined by 
Gurr as “relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular 
participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized 
rebellions.”48 His description here closely aligns with my own research, although my own 
study will refrain from looking at rebellions as a source of political violence. For the 
purposes of this research, this definition will serve to define the cases that are introduced 
later in the case studies.  
 
45 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: published for the Center of International 
Studies by Princeton University Press, 1970). 
46 Ibid., 4. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 11. 
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Gurr’s study looks to determine the psychological and social sources of collective 
violence and in doing so he introduces some interesting ideas that I will incorporate in 
my methodology. In his work, Gurr developed his own theory called the frustration-
aggression proposition which states that “the greater the frustration, the greater the 
quantity of aggression against the source of frustration.”49 Simply put, he states that a 
correlation exists between frustration and the magnitude of violence, suggesting that 
greater frustration leads to greater violence. In his discussion of determining the 
magnitude of violence, Gurr states that three variables should be analyzed: “the extent of 
participation within the political unit being studied (scope), the destructiveness of action 
(intensity), and the length of time violence persists (duration).”50 Whilst I am incredibly 
interested in the theory presented here, my own research will take a narrower look at 
political violence by just looking to test the intensity of violence. Nevertheless, this 
theory provides a strong base for Gurr’s research and provides me with the definitions I 
required for the development of my own models. 
            While Gurr takes a very broad, yet detailed, look at the multitude of sources that 
lead to political violence, my own research is more limited to political culture. Thus, my 
research draws directly from his Chapter 6, which focusses on the socialization, tradition 
and legitimacy of the state and how it pertains to political violence. People are socialized 
to behave in their state in a variety of ways that all impact how we view violence in our 
respective states. This political “learning” can take many forms, but I believe the three 
most relevant aspects of political socialization to how we view political violence are what 
my research must focus on. These three aspects of socialization are (1) the state's 
 
49 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 9. 
50 Ibid. 
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historical precedent for violent protest, (2) the state's historical precedent in responding to 
protestors demands, and (3) the legitimacy of the state's regime in the eyes of the people. 
            For his argument on historical precedent to violence, Gurr provides his own 
hypothesis: 
“Hypothesis JV .2: The intensity and scope of normative justifications for political 
violence vary strongly with the historical magnitude of political violence in a 
collectivity.”51  
Gurr argues that states with a precedent for political violence will have a higher rationale 
for justifying political violence again. Furthermore, the intensity of the political violence 
experienced also correlates to the intensity of past uses of political violence. Therefore, 
we can expect states who have had high levels of violence in protests, or times of turmoil 
as Gurr would put it, to again experience these levels of violence in future protests. 
            For his argument on historical precedent for state response, Gurr provides his own 
hypothesis: 
“Hypothesis JV .3: The intensity and scope of normative and utilitarian justifications for 
political violence vary moderately with the effectiveness and scope of past regime action 
in alleviating relative deprivation.”52 
Here the argument is made that the states response and effectiveness at alleviating the 
issues affecting the protestors engaging in violence directly correlates to the protestor’s 
justification for violence. Furthermore, he argues that the precedent for response also 
determines how intense the violence actually is. Perhaps, those protestors from a 
 
51 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 170. 
52 Ibid., 182. 
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historically apathetic state would engage with more intense violence than those in a state 
that were historically more sympathetic to protestors wants. 
            For his argument on the legitimacy of the state, Gurr provides his own hypothesis: 
“Hypothesis JV .5: The intensity and scope of normative justifications for political 
violence vary strongly and inversely with the intensity and scope of legitimacy.”53  
Gurr argues that as a state loses legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, an inverse 
reaction occurs that leads to a higher sense of justification for intense political violence. 
Therefore, the socialization of a state includes how the citizens view the state in terms of 
legitimacy.  
            The importance of this literature view comes explicitly through its ability to 
explain the terms deemed essential to the research I have conducted. However, the 
explanations provided are brief and surface level explanations of concepts and theories 
that have decades of study behind them. Subsequently, these three hypotheses will be 
discussed further in my own methodology as I link these topics of socialization to the 
models discussed in Almond and Verba’s text. Only the essentials will be incorporated 
and detailed appropriately in my methodology, but the literature review operates to 
inform the reader that this research is prominent and that my own research serves a 
purpose to link concepts and fill gaps. By establishing this field of study, I hope to 
persuade the reader that my own goals are attainable and worthwhile for pushing the 
boundaries of international relations theory. 
 
 
53 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 185. 
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Methodology and Research Design 
  The main challenge that arises in my research – being to demonstrate a 
correlation between political culture and political violence – comes from connecting two 
principle texts from my literature review. While related, these two texts are still focused 
on unique aspects of comparative politics theory, and I must be able to convincingly 
bridge the gap between these two realms. The literature review introduced the core 
concepts and literature of my research, but it is through this methodology that I will pull 
the essentials from these prior analyses. Moreover, I craft my own models based upon the 
works of Almond and Verba that incorporate the theories and hypotheses devised by 
Gurr. These models will be used to test my own claim in this thesis – that political culture 
is directly linked to the level of political violence a state experiences in protests, as a 
result of the forms of socialization the aforementioned political culture breeds. 
 Before discussing these models, it is important that I note what aspects of the 
literature review I deem essential, and what will be left out of my own research. In the 
discussion of Almond and Verba, the introduction of the parochial, subject, and 
participant societies was important in that it developed and explained the concepts in The 
Civic Culture more wholly. However, my own research only pertains to the study of 
states undergoing civil unrest and thus, the parochial system proves itself unimportant for 
my work. The parochial system explicitly states that every object of the political system 
is orientated to the point of approaching zero, meaning that almost no interaction occurs 
between the state and its inhabitants. This system, while interesting in its own right, has 
no correlation to the theoretical assumptions I am making through this thesis. 
 There exists a gap in the literature that I hoped to engage with here in the 
methodology as well. This gap is the lack of clarity or definition of these disparate levels 
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of violence. I have henceforth developed my own definitions that list four classifications 
for political violence in times of political protest. 
High Levels of Political Violence: This is the highest classification of political violence in 
a state. Examples of such violence include the use of extreme force through assault, 
heavy destruction of public property, the use of Molotov Cocktails, arson, deaths, etc. 
This level of violence must precede any full-scale revolution and must be contained 
within the confines of the protest. 
Middling Levels of Political Violence: This middling tier explains violence that operates 
in between high and low levels. Political violence can fall into this category when 
examples of both high and low tiers of violence are prevalent and yet, no single grouping 
can be accurately used to categorize said violence.  
Low Levels of Political Violence: This is the lowest level of actual political violence that 
can be found within a state. Examples of such violence include the use of light force 
through vandalism, light destruction of public property, throwing of non-lethal objects 
(shakes, rocks, etc.), violence towards government response officials, etc. This level of 
violence must precede the qualifications listed for a high and middling level of political 
violence. 
No Political Violence: This is the lowest level of political violence that can be found 
within a state. This level is purely peaceful and must not include any means of violence. 
With these four classifications, my case studies can more accurately measure the 
disparities that I am investigating in my research. The definitions provided allow for my 
case studies to have a definite end result, creating a comparable result for my analyses.  
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.1: If a participant state has precedent for both a high level of violence in 
political protests and a weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens 
have precedent for viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a high level of political 
violence can be expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.1 Figure 
 Level of Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Participant 
State “X” 
High Weak Illegitimate High 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: If a participant state has both precedent for only a low level of violence 
in political protests and precedent for a generous state response to the wants of past 
protests, and the citizens view the regime as legitimate, then low levels of violence can be 
expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.2 Figure 
 Level of Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Participant 
State “X” 
Low High Legitimate Low 
 
Seeing as though participant state systems are made up of citizens strongly 
oriented to all objects of the political system, it is expected that precedent and legitimacy 
would be strong influences on justifications for political violence. Citizens in said system 
understand their position within the state and view their role as important prompting 
justifications for, or against, violence to be more directly tied to the behavior and 
expectations of the regime. Therefore, if a participant state has not responded favorably 
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to protests in the past, current protestors are likely to resort to high levels of violence due 
to the frustration-aggression theory and protestors’ expectation that the state will not 
favorably respond to their wants. Whereas, if the state has acted favorably in the past, 
current protestors will be much slower to engage in violent action, if at all, as the state 
has proven itself as compromising in the past. Therefore, my expected levels of violence 
in Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.2 expect these states to maintain their precedented 
levels of political violence. 
Hypothesis 1.3: If a subject state has precedent for both high violence in protest and a 
generous state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens have precedent for 
viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a middling level of political violence can still be 
expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.3 Figure 
 Level of Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Subject 
State 
“X” 
High High Illegitimate Middling 
 
Hypothesis 1.4: If a subject state has both precedent for low violence in protest and a 
weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens view the regime as 
legitimate, then low levels political violence can be expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.4 Figure 
 Level of Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Subject 
State 
“X” 
Low Weak Legitimate Low 
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The subject state is expected to be comprised primarily of non-actors who 
understand the state and yet do not wish to interact with it. This comes as a result of 
having no orientation to the input objects of the system, which participant states have. 
The people in these systems are not taught to participate or possibly are not allowed to do 
so and thus are less quick to turn to violence. However, they are still oriented to the 
output objects of the state and thus are more reactionary to the state, rather than 
participant societies which are all encompassing in their orientation. Furthermore, as 
Hypothesis 1.3 shows, favorable state precedent and the subject political culture together 
can still be expected to overrule the influence of an illegitimate state with a precedent for 
high levels of violence. Thus, leading me to state that said state should anticipate a lower 
level of violence than precedented. Hypothesis 1.4 does not experience this decrease in 
the level of violence as a result of the weak state response in the past and the already low 
levels of violence precedented. With these aspects of the state considered, it would be 
very difficult to see the next lower tier of violence - being no political violence - be 
achieved, leading me to expect low violence to be maintained.  
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Table of Figures 
 Level of Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State 
Response to 
Wants of Past 
Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Hypothesis 
1.1 
High Weak Illegitimate High 
Hypothesis 
1.2 
Low High Legitimate Low 
Hypothesis 
1.3 
High High Illegitimate Middling 
Hypothesis 
1.4 
Low Weak Legitimate Low 
 
 These figures serve as my models for my own theoretical research, working to 
provide me the backdrop required for my case studies. Whilst further dissemination of 
these models could be studied with more variance in the levels of precedent or more 
nuanced feelings of legitimacy, the models I have created allow for a direct observation 
of my research questions. Furthermore, the use of these specific combinations allows for 
us to view real life states that fit these models and show the wide range of application that 
variations of these models could be used for in further studies. They serve a direct 
purpose and allow for a more coherent, and simpler, discussion of the case studies that I 
have selected. The models created have been evaluated and will be assigned states that 
seemingly fit into the precedent and feelings of legitimacy during protest.  
For clarification, my use of legitimacy in this research does not align with 
traditional expectations of the term. Whereas legitimacy most commonly refers to a 
society’s view of a state as an acceptable authority, my interpretation looks at the 
propensity of a society to act on these feelings of illegitimacy. Therefore, my 
classification of illegitimate in my hypotheses refers only to the state having precedent 
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for citizens viewing the state as illegitimate and subsequently acting on this belief – 
shown through a revolution or coup de tat. Conversely, my classification as legitimate 
refers to a state that has no precedent for being viewed as illegitimate and thus, no past 
action on these feelings. This aspect of socialization is expected to further justify political 
violence in a state concurrently with the precedented view of legitimacy. Models with an 
aspect of socialization listed as illegitimate will be more likely to justify higher levels of 
violence, while models with this aspect of socialization listed as legitimate will not be as 
likely to justify these higher levels.  
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Case Study Selections 
The cases below have been selected because they most closely exemplify the 
political culture and three aspects of socialization listed in their paired figure. They have 
been selected so that the hypotheses I have created can be tested directly using real-life 
models and comparative analyses of political protests across the world. 
Case Study One: This case study tests Hypothesis 1.1 using Iran as the backdrop 
for analysis. Iran exemplifies the political culture traits of a participant culture by having 
citizens fully oriented to the political system. Iran also has historical precedent for high 
levels of violence in protest and a history for weak state response to protestors wants. 
Furthermore, Iranians have a history of viewing their state as illegitimate during times of 
political dissent. Their propensity to view the state as illegitimate assures us that they 
have been socialized for this behavior and their past revolutions, like the revolution in 
1979, give proof to this claim. These qualifications will be further explored and dissected 
within the case studies before introducing the protests that will fully test my hypothesis. 
Case Study Two: This case study tests Hypothesis 1.2 using the United States as 
the backdrop for analysis. The U.S. exemplifies the political culture traits of a participant 
culture by having citizens fully oriented to the political system, albeit in a different 
fashion to Iran. Whereas Iran may have citizens more explicitly involved through public 
dissent, the U.S. has a political culture that expects citizens to vote extensively. The U.S. 
also has little to no precedent for high levels of political violence and generally has a high 
level of state response to protestors wants. Solidarity with the state and its long-standing 
institutions, like the Constitution, also mean that people generally view the state as 
legitimate. These qualifications will all be further examined through the case studies and 
the protests within the U.S. will allow for me to test my hypothesis. 
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Case Study Three: This case study tests Hypothesis 1.3 using France as the 
backdrop for analysis. France fits into the subject system simply because the citizens are 
more inclined to be involved with the output objects of the political system and due to the 
recent failings of the traditional input objects. This is evident through the fact that, while 
France is a liberal democracy, the involvement of citizens of France with input objects of 
orientation is limited. This was even supported by Almond and Verba, who stated that a 
“French royalist is aware of democratic institutions; he simply does not accord legitimacy 
to them.”54 France also has strong precedent for high levels of violence in protests and a 
generally favorable response from the government to past wants of prior political 
protests, perhaps in fear of the aggressive protests of the past. French history of regime 
change also shows the propensity to view the state as illegitimate and qualifies them for 
this third aspect of socialization. These claims will all be explored more thoroughly in the 
case study and the examination of French protests will allow me to test my hypothesis. 
Case Study Four: This case study tests Hypothesis 1.4 using Russia as the 
backdrop for analysis. Russia fits most closely to the subject political system as the 
citizens of the state are generally apathetic to the often-corrupt input orientations of the 
state and are thus more inclined to react to policy on the output aspect. Furthermore, 
Russia has little to no precedent for high levels of violence in protests and a history of 
weak response to the wants of political protestors. However, despite their weak response 
to protests, Russian citizens have still not had a revolution since the Bolshevik 
Revolution in 1917. Even this, however, led to the creation of the Soviet Union and not 
the more recent Russian Federation that will be analyzed in this research. Tensions are 
 
54 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 19. 
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rising in Russia, and disdain for corrupt politics may eventually breed citizens who view 
the state as illegitimate, but as of right now, these feelings have yet to be acted on in a 
revolutionary fashion. These claims will be analyzed in this case study with greater depth 
and the discussion of Russian protests will serve as a means to test this hypothesis. 
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Case Study One: Iran 
Hypothesis 1.1: If a participant state has precedent for both a high level of violence in 
political protests and a weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens 
have precedent for viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a high level of political 
violence can be expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.1 Figure 
 Level of Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Participant 
State “X” 
High Weak Illegitimate High 
 
 Using the analyses of Almond and Verba in conjunction with the three aspects of 
socialization found in Gurr’s text, I test the correlation between political culture and 
political violence in Iran. In conducting this case study, I examined how Iran serves 
Hypothesis 1.1, how Iran exemplifies the aspects of socialization listed in this hypothesis, 
and the level of violence that my model predicted Iran to experience during political 
protest. The hypothesis’ predictions were then applied to political violence in Iran today 
to test the validity of my claims. Although I would love to claim this case study as a 
successful test of my model, certain factors gave me pause, leading me to reflect on other 
sources that may affect political violence. The details of this study below show the 
complexities that accompany this study. 
How Iran Serves Hypothesis 1.1 
 In this hypothesis, Iran is identified as a largely participant system, meaning that 
its citizens are oriented to all aspects of the objects listed in the literature review over 
political culture. These, again, include: the system as a general object, input objects, 
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output objects and the self as an object. Iran has affectionately been known as “A Cradle 
of Civilization” by numerous sources.55 The average Iranian citizen is aware of this 
cultural impact and are proud of this belief. Viewing the system as a general object means 
that citizens within the state have knowledge of their “political system in general terms, 
its history, size, location, power.”56 The pride felt from being such an integral part of 
world history coupled with Iran’s geo-political power creates a state with citizens that are 
orientated to the system as a general object and beginning to qualify Iran as a participant 
culture. 
 As for the input objects, these entail the understanding a citizen has of “the 
structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved 
in the upward flow of policy making.”57 These upward flow mechanics include political 
parties and elections wherein action is taken by citizens preemptively, rather than in 
response to the state. In a report published by the Statista Research Department, some of 
these input objects can explicitly be seen in Iran. Their research shows that, since 1980 
and up until their most recent data set of 2017, Iran has always had voter turnout rates 
above 50% in election years.58 This is an impressive statistic on its own, but if we read 
further in between the lines, voter turnout is shown to be remarkably high. In October of 
 
55 “Kermanshah, A Cradle of Civilization,” Iran Daily, August 9, 2006, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070928124326/http://www.iran-daily.com/1385/2631/pdf/i12.pdf; Sabine 
Oelze, “How Iran Became a Cradle of Civilization,” DW, April 13, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/how-
iran-became-a-cradle-of-civilization/a-38414704; David Rahni, “Iran: The Historical Cradle of 
Civilization, the Origin of Human Diversity, and the Bastion of Humanistic Tolerance,” London 
Progressive, December 1, 2017, http://londonprogressivejournal.com/article/view/2843/iran-the-historical-
cradle-of-civilization-the-origin-of-human-diversity-and-the-bastion-of-humanistic-tolerance.  
56 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17. 
57 Ibid. 
58 “Voter Turnout Rates in Iran 1980–2017,” Statista, accessed April 16, 2020, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/692094/iran-voter-turnout-rate/.  
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1981 and 1997 voter turnout reached 74.26% and 79.92% respectively.59 Furthermore, 
turnout rates reached their peak in 2009 with an astounding 85.21% of the population 
voting.60 Even as more recent elections show a lower turnout, these rates show strong 
orientation of the Iranian people to input objects of their political system which further 
qualifies Iran as a participant system. 
 Output models, being the knowledge of the “downward flow of policy 
enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these processes,” are 
also evident in Iran.61 This classification represents the reactionary aspects of political 
action, as people respond to the actions of the state. Moreover, it is the action citizens 
take in response to implementation of new policies or institutions that the state has 
decided upon. Political dissent represents the most direct form of this type of object and 
seeing as though protests are an integral part of this research, I feel it important to 
highlight a couple of these protests here. Iran is no stranger to political dissent, but in a 
more contemporary sense, the past twenty years especially have been a hotbed for 
dissent. In 1999, “students at Tehran University gathered to protest” and in 2009 “the 
Green Movement . . . reached its height when up to 3 million peaceful demonstrators 
turned out on Teheran streets.”62 From 2017 to 2018, citizens “took to the streets to 
protest the government’s economic policies” and just earlier this year in January of 2020, 
“Iranians launched anti-government protests after officials admitted that the 
Revolutionary Guards had mistakenly shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 
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60 “Voter Turnout Rates in Iran 1980–2017.” 
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752.”63 These protests show that Iranian citizens are not strangers to dissent and their 
orientation to these output objects satisfies this aspect of my model. 
 Finally, the view of oneself as an object can be defined as the individual’s belief 
of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, 
powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.”64 This is where Iran holds 
only a vague link to the participant system, seemingly as a result of the authoritarian 
structure of the regime. In a poll taken by the World Values Survey, “18.7 percent of men 
and 12.6 percent of women reported ‘frequently’ discussing politics with friends; 
respectively, 28.8 and 24.2 percent reported ‘never’ doing so.”65 These are low numbers 
and certainly seem to point to low orientation to the “self as an object,” which contradicts 
the expectations of a participant system. However, I retort that it was already discussed in 
the literature review that states are not beholden to one dominant system, as varying 
degrees of other systems can permeate a state. Furthermore, as Iran is authoritative and 
freedom of speech is more limited than in liberal democracies, the expectations that 
citizens within Iran would view themselves as vocal “members of his political system” is 
improbable. Therefore, given the circumstances surrounding the authoritarian regime 
hindering the orientation to this object, I still believe it permissible for Iran to serve this 
model. 
How Iran Fits the Socialization of Hypothesis 1.1 
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 Hypothesis 1.1 presupposes a state that has experienced high levels of violence in 
political protests of the past; Iran serves this expectation in a variety of ways. In an article 
published by The New York Times, an Iranian journalist details some of the protesting 
that took place in 2009 in Tehran. This journalist, Maziar Bahari, states that he “turned 
his camera on a small number of demonstrators hurling Molotov cocktails.”66 As “some 
of the protestors tried to storm the base . . . Basij militiamen, who had been firing tear gas 
and warning shots, began shooting indiscriminately into the crowd.”67 This quickly 
shifted what was originally a peaceful protest into a prime example of high levels of 
violence, according to my own classifications. Looking further back to the revolution in 
1979, we can see this precedent for violence in some of the protesting that took place the 
year prior. The Qum Protests of 1978 were originally peaceful but as “demonstrators 
were starting to comply . . . someone – police officials claimed it was protestors; 
protesters claimed it was provocateurs – threw stones through a nearby bank window.”68 
This in turn led to the crowd “[shouting] slogans, [breaking] store windows, and 
[resisting] the security forces with branches and stones.”69 The level of violence portrayed 
across these cases give strong precedent for high levels of violence in Iran, accurately 
portraying this aspect of socialization. 
 Hypothesis 1.1 also expects state response to these protests to be weak, meaning 
that the wants of the protestors are not met or that violence is directed to the protestors 
from the state. Already, we have seen that the protests in Iran are often met with stiff 
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resistance and government crackdown, often leading to high death tolls and mass arrests. 
To speak on the response of the state more specifically however, it is best to look back at 
the Green Movement and the results of the 2009 election. In 2009, “following a heated 
campaign between reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and incumbent President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” Iranians voted in droves with 85.21% of the population 
accounted for.70 This all took place amid “allegations of vote rigging and election fraud” 
which prompted “public demonstrations in several major cities” throughout Iran.71 These 
demonstrations were met with harsh governmental crackdown, as “nominal leaders of the 
uprising were systematically arrested, subjected to kangaroo courts and jailed” while Mir 
Hossein Mousavi, a symbolic leader of the movement, was “put under house arrest and 
silenced.”72 This was a generally peaceful movement and yet popular figures were 
silenced and even arrested while protestors were killed. Iran can certainly be said to have 
a weak response to the wants of protestors and thus, satisfies this aspect of socialization. 
 Finally, my final aspect of socialization deals with the state as a legitimate – or 
illegitimate – entity. However, this discussion does not seek to claim any state or regime 
as legitimate or illegitimate – I will not claim to be the authority on regime legitimacy 
here. Rather, I hope to state that the citizens of said state have the propensity, and 
precedent, of claiming the state as illegitimate and acting against the authority of said 
state. Already we have seen Iranian protestors claiming election fraud and mass protests 
in Iran have often stirred fears of full-scale revolution for many government officials. 
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These fears coupled with the recency of the 1979 Revolution show that Iranian civilians 
do in fact have the propensity to view the regime as illegitimate. Thus, all aspects of 
political socialization expected by my model have been satisfied.  
Expected Levels of Violence in Iran: 
 
 With these aspects of socialization, my model predicts political violence in protest 
to be high in Iran. Examples of high violence include the use of extreme force through 
assault, heavy destruction of public property, the use of Molotov cocktails, arson, death, 
etc. To test this, my research will look closely at a more recent protest, going through the 
three types of socialization and working through how they influence the protestors, and 
ultimately, the level of political violence they appropriate. In order for my hypothesis to 
be satisfied, this protest must show strong connection to my definition of high violence, 
meaning that a clear set of examples must be achieved. My research in this case study 
will be further discussed in my conclusion, following the remaining case studies. 
Protest in Iran: 
 Whilst protests are ongoing in Iran right now, as a result of the revelation of Iran’s 
involvement with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, my research 
will focus on the protests that took place over late 2017 into 2018. These protests, 
collectively known as the Dey Protests, “were the largest demonstrations since the 2009 
Green Movement.”73 These protests were slightly different than the Green Movement 
however, as Dey “lacked organization and leadership, was unequivocally anti-regime, 
and attacked Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the principles of clerical government 
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explicitly.”74 This was a very different protest which may cause concern as to whether the 
precedent used in the three aspects of socialization can truly be applicable. However, I 
retort that it is those events that socialize the public and form their expectations and 
justifications for political violence – independent of the core issues at stake in the protest.  
 As for the political violence itself, the Dey protests proved to be quite eventful 
after all; a research report by a professor and his co-researcher, Dr. Afshin Shahi and 
Ehsan Abdoh-Tabrizi, at the University of Bradford (UK) detail these events and the 
actions that now characterize them. His research states that “in the December 2017 to 
January 2018 protests, the protesters attacked and torched police stations, Basij and IRGC 
outposts and state- related religious foundations.”75 For further clarification, the “Basij 
Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organization operating under the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC)” which “Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
has mobilized . . . to counter perceived threats to the regime.”76 The violence only 
escalated however, as “around 20-30 individuals were killed” in just a two-week period; 
“two of them were IRGC and Basij personnel.”77 This can be compared to the much 
longer period of protests during the Green Movement wherein violence was notably less 
prevalent, although still present and high. The escalation of this violence and these 
specifics will be considered for my own research. 
 My hypothesis expects high levels of violence in Iranian protests, and as shown 
through these sources, high levels of political violence did occur. Heavy damage to 
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public property, torching of police stations, and the deaths of government personnel all 
satisfy my definition for high violence. It would be easy for me to claim this as a success 
and as definitive proof for my hypothesis. However, I have my own reservations about 
these findings and how the data I am presenting may be warped by external factors 
outside of the socialization I discussed in this case study. My hypothesis suggests that the 
precedent for violence encourages and justifies the use of violence in subsequent protests. 
It also suggests that precedent for weak state response to protestors wants naturally 
encourages a strong inclination to high levels of violence against to state, in order to 
further spur the state into action. And, finally, my hypothesis believes that a state with 
citizens who have the propensity to view the regime as illegitimate can expect high levels 
of violence. All three of these aspects of socialization can be stated to have had an impact 
on the Dey protests. My reservations for resting on these influencers comes from my 
belief that the lack of organization and the wider demographics of the Dey protests may 
have also had an impact. With no leader and a much broader audience, the crowds 
become more difficult to control and escalation becomes more accessible. In my 
conclusion, my findings and these reservations will be discussed again in conjunction 
with the rest of my case studies. 
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Case Study Two: The United States 
Hypothesis 1.2: If a participant state has both precedent for only a low level of violence 
in political protests and precedent for a generous state response to the wants of past 
protests, and the citizens view the regime as legitimate, then low levels of violence can be 
expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.2 Figure 
 Level of Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Participant 
State “X” 
Low High Legitimate Low 
 
 This case study, like the first, uses the analyses of Almond and Verba alongside 
the three aspects of socialization found in Gurr’s text. Using these sources, I test the 
correlation between political culture and political violence by using the United States as 
my case study. I explore how the United States serves Hypothesis 1.2 accurately, how the 
U.S. exemplifies the aspects of socialization listed in Hypothesis 1.2, and the level of 
violence that my model expects this case study to produce during a political protest. My 
predictions were then analyzed using real life protesting in the United States to see if my 
models were able to accurately portray the political violence within the U.S., as a result 
of the state’s political culture and socialization. Whilst Model 1.2 was found to be correct 
in predicting the level of political violence, external factors similar to those in case study 
one prevents me from affirming my hypothesis here again.  
How the U.S. Serves Hypothesis 1.2 
 Like Iran, the United States closely resembles a participant political culture, 
meaning that all aspects of the four objects listed in the literature review on political 
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culture are orientated to. These four objects being: the system as a general object, input 
objects, output objects and the self as an object. The first of these, the system as a general 
object, means that citizens in the state understand their “political system in general terms, 
its history, size, location, power.”78 Just off definition alone, it is hard to imagine a way 
this does not fit in with the bravado and unabashed patriotism that many Americans 
boast. This feeling perhaps being a derivative of the standards across U.S. education that 
enforce learning about the American political system. A study published by Tufts 
University in 2012 states that “civics/government along with other disciplines such as 
history and geography” are found in all states with “the theme of civic ideals and 
practices . . . found in every state’s standard except Missouri’s.”79 With this incredibly 
widespread application of these values, it can stated that the United States strongly 
qualifies for this aspect of orientation to the participant culture. 
 Moving on to the input objects, which are defined as the understanding a citizen 
has of “the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that 
are involved in the upward flow of policy making,”80 we see further distinction. Wherein 
the Iranian orientation to input objects focused on the turnouts for elections, American 
voter rates have never been as strong. However, input objects are still an integral part of 
American political culture as interactions with, and allegiance to, political parties 
dominate American political discussion. Involvement with these parties varies in scope 
and size but can include things like “volunteering for or donating to campaigns, attending 
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protests or meetings, contacting officials or expressing their views on social media.”81 Of 
these examples, a study done by Pew Research Center found that overall, “a large 
majority (67%) reports having engaged in at least one of these activities in the past five 
years; nearly half (46%) say they have done so in the past year alone.”82 These numbers 
show strong connection to the input objects of the political system and show how 
Americans interact with politics preemptively. This interaction qualifies the United States 
for this aspect of the participant political culture laid out by Almond and Verba. 
 The output models of a participant system, defined as the knowledge of the 
“downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions 
involved in these processes,” are also quite evident in the United States. As discussed in 
the Iranian case study, these reactionary responses can be most easily identified through 
political protest. Political dissent is not an anomaly in the United States as a number of 
protests have occurred over the past twenty years alone. Starting in spring 2016, 
“thousands of people . . . gathered near Cannon Ball, N.D., to protest the construction of 
an oil pipeline near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation” which “have occasionally 
resulted in violent clashes with law enforcement.”83 In 2007, protests erupted as 
“thousands of anti-war demonstrators . . .  marched on the Pentagon . . .  to mark four 
years of war” in Iraq.84 In 2009, while many dispute the actual size of the protests, 
“thousands of conservative protestors from across the country converged on the Capitol . 
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. . to demonstrate against President Obama’s proposals for health care reform and voicing 
opposition to big government.”85 These protests all serve to prove that American citizens 
are fully oriented to the output objects of the political system further showing that it 
supports a participatory system. 
 The final object, being the view of oneself as an object, is defined as the 
individual’s belief of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of 
“his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.”86 The United 
States prides itself as being a country for all; a place where the so-called “American 
Dream” can be achieved by anyone. According to Pew Research Statistics, “most 
Americans say they have achieved the ‘American dream’ or are on their way to achieving 
it” with “just 17% of Americans [saying] that the American dream is ‘out of reach’ for 
their family.”87 American citizens identify with this goal and the majority believe they 
have achieved it, cementing their belief of themselves being a functional member of the 
state. This, alongside the prior three objects, qualifies the United States as a participatory 
culture and allows for it to be used in this case study. 
How the United States Fits the Socialization Aspects of Hypothesis 1.2 
 Hypothesis 1.2 expects a state to have experienced only low violence in prior 
protests, an expectation the U.S. strongly follows. In the Iranian case, we looked at 
examples of protests wherein Molotov cocktails and destruction of public property 
dominated the conversation. In the United States, protests range in their scale of political 
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violence but never reach the heights seen in Iran, instead only rarely erupting to the low 
levels of violence my model predicts. In 2017, “some 4.1 million people reportedly took 
part in the various Women’s Marches across the United States” which “remained largely 
peaceful, with no arrests reported in Washington, DC, and only a handful in other 
cities.”88 This was a wide scale protest with millions of participants and yet no escalations 
of violence occurred, with only a handful of arrests acting being made. However, in the 
same year, protests in Charlottesville had a very different result with people “beating 
each other in the streets . . . throwing things and firing pepper spray.”89 This piece by 
ABC News further states that “there were people carrying bottles full of urine and others 
with bottles filled with concrete.”90 While the article states this protest as atypical for the 
United States, it still only fits into the low level of political violence in my outline. 
Therefore, the United States matches my models’ expectations of a state that has 
precedent for little to no political violence in protests. 
 With this being said, I felt it important to identify some of the outliers that exist 
against my model. In Iran, classification for a high precedent of political violence was 
shown through some of the protests that included these levels of violence. However, not 
all protests in Iran experience this intensity, as some protests remained fairly peaceful. It 
is how common this violence was and how quick the violence escalated that qualified 
Iran for Hypothesis 1.1’s model. The same can be stated for the United States, in its 
classification as a state that experiences low violence. Outliers do exist, and in the 2015 
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Baltimore riots, this became evident. During these protests, which were originally 
“peaceful demonstrations,” “demonstrators looted, burned 144 vehicles and 15 buildings, 
and threw bricks, bottles, and other objects at police” certainly qualifying this as a high 
level of violence.91 This protest serves as an outlier however, as it is a local demonstration 
that while expressing concern over a national issue, did not become a national protest. 
The prior paragraph discussing the low, and sometimes non-existent, political violence in 
the United States serves to show the “normal” level of violence that Americans 
experience in protest.  
 Hypothesis 1.2 also expects state response to these protests to be favorable and 
strong, with the wants of the protestors being heard and action being taken by the state. In 
the United States, as a liberal democracy, representatives are held accountable by their 
constituents and protests only heighten the urgency of this relationship. Preceding the 
Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, “the Montgomery bus boycott was a 13-month mass 
protest that ended with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that segregation on public buses is 
unconstitutional.”92 This was a controversial decision for its time and yet, the Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the protestors, changing historical precedent and the course of the 
United States. To look at a more contemporary issue, the March for Our Lives protests 
also show strong nationwide response to the wants of the protestors. These protests for 
stronger gun control came after the Parkland shooting and led to “states across the 
country, including 14 with Republican governors, [enacting] 50 new laws restricting 
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access to guns.”93 This also followed a federal ban on the selling of bump stocks, showing 
further precedent for strong state response in the United States 
 Finally, we look at the legitimacy of the state, and seeing as though the United 
States has not experience revolution the way Iran has, state allegiance is more obvious. I 
hold that the legitimacy of the state rests upon the Constitution our nation is built upon 
and the system of checks and balances that splits power in our government. No one 
singular entity holds all power in the United States, and with the Constitution preserving 
our own liberties, we as Americans feel we have little to fear. Furthermore, with a 
representative democracy, our leaders are beholden to the whims of the society if they 
wish to be elected. This mix of kempt government, personal liberties, and strong 
representation of the majority breeds a state that has little danger of being viewed as 
illegitimate, evident by the lack of mass revolts in American history. With the three 
aspects of socialization thus sated, we now look to the expectations of my model and 
Hypothesis 1.2. 
Expected Levels of Violence in the United States: 
 My model predicts that a state that experiences these types of socialization, under 
a participant system, should expect low levels of violence. Low levels of violence 
examples include vandalism, light destruction of public property, throwing of non-lethal 
objects, light violence towards government officials, etc. My analysis of American 
protests will look at a recent nationwide protest, observing the impact of these three 
aspects of socialization and their influence on the level of political violence the protests 
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experience. For my model and for Hypothesis 1.2 to be satisfied, this protest must be 
shown to be logically tied to my definition of low violence, meaning that the examples 
listed must be observed but not exceeded into definitions of middling or high violence. 
The results of this case study will again be discussed in my conclusion, following the 
remaining case studies. 
Protest in the United States: 
 In my examination of political violence in America, I sought to analyze the series 
of protests that occurred quickly after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of 
the United States. During these protests, “six police officers were injured and 217 
protestors [were] arrested” as “protestors smashed storefronts and bus stops, hammered 
out the windows of a limousine and eventually launched rocks at a phalanx of police.”94 
This level of violence comes incredibly close to crossing into my definition of high levels 
of violence and may qualify as the middling tier, which does not bode well for my 
hypothesis. However, the protests continued into the next day, becoming the 2017 
Women’s March, with a decidedly different level of violence. 
 The day after the inauguration, “hundreds of thousands of men and women 
descended into the nation’s capital . . . to show their support for women’s rights” (13). 
Here “an estimated 500,000 people attended” and “those who participated . . . said the 
event was much more peaceful and positive than the protests during Friday’s 
inauguration.”95 These are connected protests but a disconnect obviously persists that 
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separates these days. The events of the inauguration protests threaten to deviate from my 
hypothesis in that the violence seems to be on the extreme side of my definition of low 
violence. However, the protests of the next day remained peaceful, threatening my model 
on the opposite end as no political violence occurred. In order to understand this 
disparity, in what seems like connected protests, my research led me to view these acts of 
violence under more scrutiny. 
According to witnesses of the protests, “self-described anarchists were behind 
some of Friday’s violence.”96 This explanation brings the point that, just as outliers exist 
in protests, so too do protests have external actors who may cause trouble. Yet, the 
Huffington Post has another additional explanation for this disparity in violence. This 
article argues that “a large group of mostly white women wearing pink hats is simply not 
going to be policed in the same way a large group of people of color would be.”97 They 
tout precedent from the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Lives Matter movement, 
which often turned violent, as their rationale for this claim. As it stands, the protests of 
the inauguration fit into my model by showing low levels of violence as a result of the 
socialization and precedent of past protests, so long as these outliers are not included. As 
the anarchists were behind the bulk of the violence on Friday and seeing as though their 
absence the next day meant no violence occurred, I feel comfortable claiming this event 
as a low level of violence once the anarchists’ actions are removed. However, it is 
apparent to me that other factors that my research did not consider could also have a large 
effect on this data.  
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Hypothesis 1.2 expects low levels of violence in American protests and low levels 
of violence, albeit borderline, did persist. I should be able to claim this as a successful 
test of my model, but, similarly to the Iranian case study, I ran into issues. The first of 
these begs the question as to whether these protests, which occurred over the span of two 
days, can truly be described as one singular event given the differences in violence. 
Furthermore, with the possibility of anarchists being behind the bulk of the violence in 
this protest, how can I distinguish their actions against the actions of the “true” 
protestors? Finally, the response of the state cannot be expected to be the same for every 
protest and thus the socialization of government response must also be considered. As 
people organize protests, it is fair to assume they understand what to expect in the way of 
policing and government response on the day of the protest. As this can change from 
protest to protest, perhaps along ethnic and racial lines, it presents another avenue for my 
research to consider. Therefore, despite my model’s “success” in predicting a low level of 
violence, excluding the outliers I identified, these external factors complicate my data. 
Further discussion of these external factors will be made in my conclusion. 
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Case Study Three: France 
Hypothesis 1.3: If a subject state has precedent for both high violence in protest and a 
generous state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens have precedent for 
viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a middling level of political violence can still be 
expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.3 Figure 
 Level of 
Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Subject 
State “X” 
High High Illegitimate Middling 
 
 This case study also uses the analyses of Almond and Verba alongside Gurr’s 
three socialization aspects seen above. This correlation between political culture, being a 
subject system in this case, and political violence was tested by using France as my case 
study. This case study first explains how France fits the definition of a subject political 
system in Hypothesis 1.3, how France exemplifies the aspects of socialization listed in 
Hypothesis 1.3, and the level of violence that my models predict France to experience 
during political protest. The hypothesis’ predictions were applied to political violence in 
France today, in order to gauge their success at predicting political violence. 
Unfortunately, the level of political violence that France experienced in my test was high 
rather than middling, thus leading me to reject Hypothesis 1.3. An explanation for the 
failure of my model can be seen at the end of this case study. 
How France Serves Hypothesis 1.3 
 Hypothesis 1.3 works as a means to test a subject state and its unique models of 
socialization. As a subject system, it is only the system as a general object and the output 
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objects that the people are oriented to. As we focus on these first, we look at the system 
as a general object, which is defined as a citizen’s knowledge of their “political system in 
general terms, its history, size, location, power.”98 In France, this can be seen most 
explicitly in a recent push from the Education Minister, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, to add 
classes on civic education. Starting in the 2015-2016 academic year, “the new course in 
Moral and Civic Education . . . will be taught in all primary and secondary school 
classrooms.”99  These classes include “four main themes: Sensitivity (understanding your 
feelings and those of others), Rules and Rights (understanding your legal rights and the 
rules of society), Critical Thinking (making rational decisions) and Social Responsibility 
(learning to become a responsible member of society).”100 These classes are nationwide 
acknowledgements of the system as a general object and as citizens go through these 
classes, they are orientated to this object. 
 The final object that subject systems are oriented to are the output objects of a 
state, or the “downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and 
decisions involved in these processes.”101 The orientation to these objects I seek to prove 
comes from the response French citizens have had to these output objects. By discussing 
some of the protests France has had in the past, we can observe the precedent for output 
orientation through a strong response to this downward flow of government. In 2005, 
“two French youths of Milan and Tunisian descent were electrocuted as they fled the 
police in the Parisian suburb of Clichysous-Bois” which “sparked nearly three weeks of 
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rioting in 274 towns.”102  In 2013, “after police carried out an identity check on a Muslim 
woman in a full-face veil,” “two nights of rioting in . . . Trappes . . . left dozens of cars 
destroyed, at least 10 arrests and a 14-year-old injured.”103 In a more recent protest, the 
2016 “Nuit Debout” movement began “on a main square in Paris, the Place de la 
République” which has “been packed with young people . . . venting their anger – at just 
about everything.”104 These protests, and many others, highlight the orientation French 
citizens have to the output objects of the subject system and shows their response to the 
states actions. 
 The subject system differs from the participant system in that the citizens of a 
subject system are not oriented to the input objects or to the view of oneself as an object. 
The input objects being the “structures and roles, the various political elites, and the 
policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making” and the view of 
oneself as an object referring to the individuals belief of “himself as a member of his 
political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies 
of access to influence.”105 My rationale for putting France in this model, thus equating it 
to a subject system that rejects the aforementioned objects, comes from the recent failings 
of their political parties. In the 2017 presidential election, “François Fillon, of the 
conservative Républicains party, and Socialist Benoît Hamon” represented the 
 
102 Peter Sahlins, “Civil Unrest in the French Suburbs, November 2005,” Social Science Research 
Council, November 1, 2005, https://items.ssrc.org/category/riots-in-france/.  
103 Angelique Chrisafis, “Paris Riots Sparked by Police Identity Check on Veiled Muslim 
Woman,” Guardian, July 21, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/21/paris-riots-police-
identity-check-muslim.  
104 Adam Nossiter, “A New Generation’s Anger Resounds From a Packed Plaza in Paris,” New 
York Times, April 29, 2016, https://nyti.ms/1NFJNvG.  
105 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17. 
 53 
longstanding two party system in France.106 However, neither of them made it to the 
secondary round of voting; “political scientists point to long-term trends to explain” this, 
including “the rise of identity politics and a feeling among voters that both parties have 
failed to change France for the better.”107 I claim that France fits this subject model 
because the people have become disillusioned with the traditional input models of France 
and thus no longer view themselves as an object as a result of this. Even despite the 
election of Emmanuel Macron in this election, who does align with the traditional party 
system, the French citizenry are failing in their orientation to these objects which 
prevents them from being a participant system. 
How France Fits the Socialization of Hypothesis 1.3 
 Similar to the Iran case study in Hypothesis 1.1, Hypothesis 1.3 expects France to 
have precedent for high levels of violence in political protests of the past. This seems to 
be quite easy to prove in this case as French protests are often violent in very high 
degrees. In the 2005 protests we examined earlier in this case study, reports state that 
rioters caused over “€200 million in damage as they torched nearly 9000 cars and dozens 
of buildings, daycare centers, and schools.”108 Furthermore, “the French police arrested 
close to 2900 rioters; 126 police and firefighters were injured, and there was one 
fatality.”109 In 2017, during the May Day Celebrations, protests ripped through France 
leading to “some 276 protestors [being] arrested” and “31 businesses [suffering] damage, 
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two of which had been set ablaze.”110 This level of violence is not uncommon in France, 
showing that French citizens are socialized to high levels of political violence, which my 
model requires. 
 Where Hypothesis 1.3 differs from Hypothesis 1.1 is in the precedent for the 
states response to protestors wants. Whereas in the first case study, Iran was shown to 
have a weak response to these protests, France bears stronger resemblance to the United 
States in that the response to protestors is quite generous. In 2015, France was rocked 
with a widespread strike from French taxi drivers who felt as though “the US-based firm 
Uber [was] stealing their livelihoods.”111 The immediate response to this movement came 
from “France’s interior minister” who “ordered a ban on the low-cost car-sharing service 
UberPOP after a day of nationwide protests.”112 Furthermore, French President Macron 
launched his “Great National Debate” that consisted of “town halls across the county to 
respond to concerns raised by the Yellow Vest movement.”113  His town halls led to a 
series of drastic reforms, seemingly in an effort to placate the growing prominence of the 
Yellow Vest movements across France. Whatever the rationale that Macron had for this 
action, it still shows the incredibly quick and favorable response that the French 
government has had in the past to protests. 
 Hypothesis 1.3 also expects a state that has precedent for the citizens to view the 
state as illegitimate, which seems to be quite common throughout French history. France 
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is on its Fifth Republic, meaning that large scale regime change has occurred four times 
since the French Revolution in 1789, twice as a direct result of political protest. For 
instance, the second republic arose as “French citizens held numerous protests and 
uprisings” leading to “a coalition of politicians [creating] a second constitution and a new 
republic in 1848.”114 The collapse of the second republic and the precedent for revolution 
from the French Revolution show strong historical support for viewing the state as 
illegitimate. Furthermore, as France has since progressed to a Fifth Republic, 
justifications for harsh regime change are not uncommon. This satisfies the final aspect of 
socialization in my model and shows that France can be used to accurately test 
Hypothesis 1.3. 
Expected Levels of Violence in France: 
 With the aspects of socialization analyzed above, Model 1.3 predicts political 
violence in protest to be middling in France. This middling level expects a mix of 
examples of violence that neither fully commit to low or high levels of violence. An 
example of such a protest could be an event wherein heavy public property destruction 
may have occurred – showing high levels of violence – but little injuries took place and 
no projectiles were used – showing low violence. To test this, my research will observe 
the most recent mass protests that have affected France, the Yellow Vest movement we 
discussed earlier. In my analysis, I will observe the protests to better understand how the 
three aspects of socialization have affected the level of violence present in current 
protesting. Furthermore, as this is a study of a subject system, my model expects a lower 
tier of violence than what precedent calls for. France has a history of high levels of 
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violence, but my model reasons that precedent for reasonable state response to protestors 
wants mixed with the subject systems expectations of a citizens more reluctant role in 
politics supports the belief that violence would lessen. Despite strong orientation to 
output objects, which can be seen through protest, my hypothesis still expects a more 
apathetic response to the state as a result of the subject system political culture and the 
socialization aspects discussed. In order to satisfy this hypothesis, I must be able to show 
a strong connection to my definition of middling violence. My research in this case study 
will also be discussed further in my conclusion, following the final case study. 
Protest in France: 
 The Yellow Vest movement “began on November 17 [2018] over planned hikes 
in diesel taxes” but quickly “snowballed into a wider movement against Macron’s 
perceived bias in favor of the elite and well-off city dwellers.”115 The movement gets its 
unique name from the yellow safety vests that protestors have donned in a show of unity 
throughout the protests. The protests also gain distinction in how long they have lasted, 
even after Macron’s Great National Debate, as protestors still persist in France today. For 
the purpose of my research, we will analyze these protests and the political violence that 
can be found in the past year. Early in the protests, “more than 250,000 people wearing 
fluorescent yellow vests joined the nationwide protests” leading to “two people [dying] 
and more than 750 others, including 136 police officers, [having] been injured.”116  This 
already shows high levels of violence as massive groups of people were injured with two 
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being fatally wounded. However, the violence did not stop here, as political violence 
persisted as the protests continued. 
 Four months into the protesting, violence continued to erupt as “rioters set fire to 
a bank . . .  ransacked stores” and “hurled cobblestones at riot police.”117  While numbers 
were down, “with an “estimated 10,000 . . . in the protest,” injuries were still numerous 
with “42 protestors, 17 of their own officers and one firefighter were injured.”118 The 
strength of these protests seems unwavering and, unfortunately for my own hypothesis, 
so too seems the strength of violence. With multiple deaths, mass injuries, and heavy 
destruction of public property, it seems impossible not to view this political violence as 
high according to my own definition. This obviously conflates with my hypothesis and 
leads me to state that Hypothesis 1.3 is unfounded. My hypothesis had suggested a 
reduction in the level of violence that France would experience, yet these elements of 
violence prevent me from stating this to be true. 
 Perhaps my expectations for a subject system to portray violence lower than what 
is historically precedented, as a result of precedent for generous state response to 
protestors, was misguided. I anticipated that generous state response would have an 
impact on the already laid-back subject culture of France and yet, no impact is detectable 
in my research. Perhaps this is an issue of time, as the recency of Macron’s Great 
National Debate could mean it has had little time to socialize the protestors in France. Or 
maybe, this is another issue of external factors affecting my research again, as those 
elements discovered in Hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 most certainly are at play here as well. 
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The reasoning behind the failure of this model will be further explored in my conclusion, 
but unfortunately, it seems as though Model 1.3 was unable to explain a correlation 
between political culture and political violence in France. My expectations that France 
would have only middling levels of violence were incorrect, as high levels of violence 
continued. 
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Case Study Four: Russia 
Hypothesis 1.4: If a subject state has both precedent for low violence in protest and a 
weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens view the regime as 
legitimate, then low levels political violence can be expected during a public protest. 
Hypothesis 1.4 Figure 
 Level of 
Precedented 
Violence in Protest 
State Response 
to Wants of 
Past Protests 
State 
Legitimacy 
Expected 
Levels of 
Violence: 
Subject 
State “X” 
Low Weak Legitimate Low 
 
 Finally, this last case study once again uses my prior analyses of Almond and 
Verba alongside the three aspects of socialization that Gurr discussed in his own text. 
This case study will use Russia in order to test the correlation between political culture 
and political violence, hoping to prove my hypothesis above. In performing this case 
study, I examined how Russia fits Hypothesis 1.4, how Russia exemplifies the aspects of 
socialization listed in this hypothesis, and the level of violence that my models predict 
Russia to experience during times of political protest. My hypothesis’ predictions were 
then applied to political violence in Russia today to test the validity of my claims. The 
conclusion of this case study shows that my models were in fact able to predict political 
violence in Russia as being low. This final case study concludes my research and allows 
for the comparative aspect of my thesis to begin. 
How Russia Serves Hypothesis 1.4: 
 Like France, Russia is identified in this case study as a subject system, meaning 
that its political culture is comprised of citizens oriented only to the system as a general 
object and to the output objects of the state. Looking at these objects, we will first 
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analyze how Russian citizens are oriented to the system as a general object, which is 
defined as a citizen’s knowledge of their “political system in general terms, its history, 
size, location, power.”119 A study done in 2004 observes the rise of this orientation as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for a stronger sense of civic education to be 
implemented in the new Russian state. This study observes how “Samara’s (a large city 
in Russia) regional minister of education made civic education a requirement in all its 
elementary and secondary schools.”120 The study makes clear that this Russian civic 
education is broad, with it being “as likely to address problems of unemployment, drug 
abuse, and children’s rights as it is to address citizen’s rights and responsibilities and the 
ways laws are passed.”121 Despite this breadth, it is clear that Russian citizens are 
instructed about their political system as a general object, thus satisfying this aspect of 
the subject political culture. 
 The next aspect, orientation to output objects of the state, is defined as knowledge 
of “the downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions 
involved in these processes.”122 Again, this orientation is most evident through the 
protests that a state experiences, which are not hard to find in Russia. In 2008, a small-
scale protest made nationwide news as “seven human rights activists kneeled on Red 
Square . . .  unfurled a banner reading ‘For Your Freedom and Ours’ . . . commemorating 
a similar action by Soviet dissidents 40 years ago.”123 In 2014, “more than 26,000 
gathered for” protests “against what [protestors] say is a covert Russian war in eastern 
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Ukraine.”124  More recently, in 2018, “about 9,000 gathered about a mile and a half from 
the Kremlin . . . against government plans to raise the pension age.”125 These protests 
show Russian precedent for protests, and thus, an orientation to object objects, solidifying 
Russia’s political culture as a predominately subject system. 
 However, the subject system also expects its citizens to not be oriented to the 
input objects or to the view of oneself as an object, as opposed to a participant system 
wherein citizens are oriented to all objects in the system. These input objects are the 
“structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are 
involved in the upward flow of policy making” and the view of oneself as an object is an 
individual’s belief of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of 
“his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.”126 Whereas in 
France, failure to achieve orientation to these objects came from the sharp decline in 
longstanding parties, Russia’s issue instead comes from the widespread corruption in the 
state that prevents citizens from orientating themselves appropriately.  
 This is evident through research done by Freedom House, an organization that 
produces data and analyses of countries around the world based upon their level of 
freedom in a variety of issues. Under the topic of whether the “current national legislative 
representatives [were] elected through free and fair elections,” Freedom House states 
“numerous violations, including ballot stuffing, pressure on voters, and illegal 
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campaigning” resulting in a score of 0/4 in this area for Russia.127 Furthermore, on the 
issue of political party involvement, Freedom House states that “the multiparty system is 
carefully managed by the Kremlin, which tolerates only superficial competition against 
the dominant United Russia party.”128 Russian politics are far from free and orientation to 
input objects is hindered by state intervention that prohibits free political parties and free 
elections. Therefore, I claim that Russia fits into the model of a subject system - having 
no orientation to input objects nor the view of oneself as an object – because citizens are 
unable to truly participate freely in politics, thus keeping them from seeing themselves as 
a true member of the political system. 
How Russian Fits the Socialization of Hypothesis 1.4: 
 Hypothesis 1.4 expects Russia to have precedent for low levels of political 
violence in past protests. Looking at protests in 2014, which criticized “President 
Vladimir V. Putin for what [protestors] saw as his warmongering in Ukraine,” we see 
protesting with “26,100 attendees” yet violence was limited to the “several scuffles [that] 
broke out.”129 In 2019, “Moscow police set an ominous record . . . by arbitrarily detaining 
at least 1,373 people, including about 25 children, during peaceful protests.”130  These 
protests, which arose after “the Moscow district election commission refused to include 
viable opposition candidates on the ballot,” were peaceful and yet still were met with 
harsh government crackdown.131 These protests, coupled with the aforementioned 2008 
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Red Square protest, show various examples of political violence that fits my definition of 
low violence. All these protests are either void of violence or resemble low violence with 
occasional fights erupting amidst the protesting. Therefore, I feel validated in affirming 
that Russia experiences low violence in past protests and thus fits Hypothesis 1.4’s first 
aspect of socialization. 
 The next aspect of socialization, being the state’s response to the wants of the 
protestors, expects a weak response in this model. Speaking to the response to the anti-
war protests of 2014, which again called for an end to Russian intervention in Ukraine, 
we can see through Russian annexation of Crimea that these protests were unsuccessful. 
Another protest, in 2012, “just days ahead of . . .  [a] planned rally against [Putin’s] 12-
year rule,” “Putin signed into law . . . a bill that will dramatically increase fines for 
people who take part in protests that violate public order rules.”132 Those who participate 
in “protests where public order is violated could now face fines of 300,000 roubles [sic] – 
more than the average annual salary and up from 1,000 roubles [sic].”133 However, critics 
of this law state that defining what a violation of public order looks like ultimately comes 
down to a decision for the state. A state, which as seen through the Freedom House 
report, has a strong precedent for subduing party opposition leaders and controls the 
media. With this law, Putin makes it very difficult for protestors to be heard freely, 
making it abundantly clear that the Russian government under his rule has no wish to 
grant any concessions. Therefore, I affirm that Russia fits Model 1.4 for this aspect of 
socialization. 
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 Finally, we must observe the aspect of socialization that determines whether 
Russian citizens have precedent or the propensity to view the state as illegitimate. Since 
1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has not been a full-scale 
revolution or regime shift in Russia. Even as some scholars suggest that the collapse of 
the Soviet Union led to a series of “soft” revolutions, I contest that Russia represents a 
different entity than the Soviet Union for the purpose of my hypothesis. Therefore, while 
Russian citizens certainly have lived through the “soft” revolution that came with the fall 
of the Soviets in 1991, they lack the socialization that true revolution gives a society. The 
classification for this aspect of socialization may be built on narrow grounds, but I still 
feel it appropriate to view Russians as having not been socialized to view the state as 
illegitimate. This is the final aspect of socialization and with this result, Russia fully fits 
into the expected qualifications of Hypothesis 1.4. 
Expected Levels of Violence in Russia: 
 Model 1.4 expects the level of political violence in Russia to remain at the 
precedented level of low violence. This may seem logically counter to the prior case 
study of France in which the expected level of violence was a tier lower than the 
precedented level, despite both states having a political culture dominated by a subject 
system. However, within France’s case study, the precedent for favorable government 
response to protestors was high, leading to my hypothesis concluding – falsely – that the 
level of expected political violence would be lower than historical precedent would 
suggest. Therefore, the same logic was used in producing Hypothesis 1.4, as precedent 
for favorable government response was weak in Russia. This leads me to state that Russia 
should expect similar levels of violence as is historically precedented. With the subject 
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system orienting people to a more apathetic view of politics and with no historically 
favorable state response found in a legitimate state, the expected level of political 
violence should remain constant with the precedent – low levels of violence. 
Protest in Russia: 
 In 2019, Russia was gripped with protests throughout the summer, culminating in 
a series of protests in Moscow that were the “largest demonstrations since Vladimir 
Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.”134 These protests were met with harsh 
government crackdown with “more than 1,000 people detained on consecutive weekends 
in July and August”; at the protest’s “height, more than 60,000 people joined.”135 While 
these “Muscovites have been peacefully protesting . . . the state… responded with 
unprecedented repression.”136 The protestors were met with “masked riot police . . . [who 
beat] them with rubber batons . . . summary arrests of opposition leaders . . . and courts 
[dispensed] harsh sentences for offences such as throwing an empty plastic bottle at 
police.”137  Despite these mass arrests, violence has been entirely disproportionate in 
Russia, with the Moscow protests being incredibly civil from the protestors side. The 
most extensive violence that my research was able to find states that “at least two 
members of the security forces reportedly received eye injuries from pepper spray.”138 In 
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the face of mass arrests and public beatings from police, this is a remarkably low level of 
retaliation that came from the Russian protestors. 
 These protests took place over months, involved thousands of protestors, were 
met with harsh government crackdown and yet the extent of the political violence 
experienced was protestor’s throwing bottles and using pepper spray. Under my 
definition for low violence, it is expected for a state to experience these types of events. It 
is obvious to me here that Russia accurately meets this definition, as these miniscule acts 
of violence keep this protest from being classified as peaceful yet cannot be fully 
classified as middling violence. Thus, Hypothesis 1.4 is affirmed through my Russia case 
study, as the level of violence I predicted was found in the low levels of violence seen in 
the 2019 protests. However, with what I have learned through my previous case studies, I 
remain wary about the validity of my findings in the face of other external factors that 
could have warped my results. My research and findings here will be discussed more 
with the rest of my findings in the conclusion of my thesis. 
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Conclusion 
Discussion of Research: 
 My research presented four hypotheses and models that would be tested using 
case studies of various states. These states were sorted into two sets of political cultures – 
participant systems being represented by Iran and the United States while subject systems 
were represented by France and Russia. The purpose of this distinction, and of my 
research overall, was to see if a correlation could be found between the political culture 
and socialization of a state and the level of political violence that a state experiences 
during times of political dissent. Using my literature review and the information I 
gleamed from prior scholars in this field, I created these four models to test this 
correlation using specific qualifications. Furthermore, the models I have created represent 
only four options out of dozens of actual possible models. Other models could be made 
using other unique combinations of socialization aspects that could be tested using other 
states in new case studies. Unfortunately, the results of the models I tested were often 
muddied by external factors and leave me wondering whether my research is truly 
conclusive. 
 Looking at Case Study One, we see that my expected level of violence was high, 
and I was able to show this level of violence was achieved in the Dey Protests my 
research analyzed. However, in my analysis I point out external aspects of the protests, 
those beyond the three socialization factors I test in my thesis, that seemingly had an 
impact on the political violence Iran experienced. These external aspects are the level of 
organization a protest may, or may not, have and the demographic the issue causing the 
protest reaches. These factors are not socializing factors like those I am analyzing in my 
research, but they are certainly factors that affect violence and are applicable to most 
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protests, not just those in Iran. I experienced similar issues in Case Study Two, which 
also was able to accurately predict the level of violence in the United States, but still 
presented its own reservations. My issue in this case was identifying how to distinguish 
protests that occur closely together as either one event, or as multiple, an issue further 
complicated by disparate violence across these days as well. Furthermore, separating 
anarchists from “true” protestors and understanding disparate government response to 
protests based upon demographics presented a wrinkle in my research.  
 Fortunately, Case Study Three and Case Study Four were not discovered to be 
mired by external factors beyond those already discussed. However, Case Study Three 
was unable to accurately predict the level of violence that would be seen in France. My 
expectations for a more laid-back subject system with favorable state response to produce 
a lower level of violence than what precedent suggests being completely unfounded in 
this process. Perhaps, as subject systems are still strongly oriented to output objects like 
protesting, the level of violence is less affected by socialization of state response and 
more so by the socialization of violence in past protests. However, Case Study Four 
opposes this claim as similar rationale was used in designing the model for Russia, which 
experienced little to no violence both in historical precedent as well as in my research of 
current protesting. My model here was seemingly correct; I expected a subject system to 
lower its violence from what was precedented as a result of the laissez faire approach to 
politics but with the precedent for weak state response to protestors, I expected the 
violence to instead remain the same. This is what happened as Russia experienced the 
same level of violence as what was historically precedented, but the same rationale did 
not accurately portray the results found in France. 
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 Looking at the results of my case studies, I can see the issues with my models that 
would need to be addressed in further research. The first two case studies identified five 
additional aspects that may impact the level of violence in a state beyond the socialization 
aspects I identified from Gurr’s text. These aspects are as follows: 1. Organization of the 
protest 2. Demographic involved with the protest 3. Distinguishing protests that occur 
closely together 4. Identifying external actors within protests 5. Understanding disparate 
government response to different demographic’s protests. These are all certainly 
applicable to most protests and I am certain that further research would reveal even more 
of these external actors that influenced my own research. As for the results of my last two 
case studies, my conflicting findings despite similar rationale muddies the results of my 
study and seemingly points to these external factors as the reasoning for this disparity. 
With my French model proving to be unfounded yet my Russian model seemingly being 
proven, I can only assume that while political culture and socialization was a factor, it 
was not the sole factor in determining the level of political violence these states 
experience. The same can be said to all my case studies, as my research suggests a 
plethora of factors that determine disparate levels of political violence - factors that exist 
beyond the reach of the research done in my thesis. 
Aim of My Thesis and Results: 
1. Does a correlation exist between the political culture of a state and the level of 
political violence found within said state? 
2. Does socialization, as an extension of political culture, explain disparate levels of 
political violence? 
3. Can the structure of a state (authoritarian, liberal democracy, etc.) be used to 
determine the level of violence said state can expect in a protest? 
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Research Question 1: 
My research questions listed above highlight the scope of my research and help 
identify the role my research plays in comparative politics theory. The first of these, and 
the main goal of my research, pondered whether a correlation between political culture 
and political violence could be proven. My definitions of political culture were defined as 
being either a subject or participant system, with the United States and Iran being 
participant systems and France and Russia being subject systems. As evident through the 
case studies, disparities persisted between these states, regardless of their shared political 
culture. Iran and the United Sates experience drastically different levels of violence and 
the same can be said between France and Russia. Therefore, my research succeeds in 
disproving this correlation. No explicit correlation exists between the political culture of 
a state and the level of political violence said state experiences during protest. 
Research Question 2: 
 My second research question asks if aspects of socialization, as an extension of 
the political culture of a state, could be used to determine the political violence of a state 
and explain the disparate levels of violence seen across states. To this question, I would 
say my research shows that while socialization cannot provide the whole picture, it most 
certainly plays a part in determining the political violence a protest will use. Evidence of 
this claim comes from examining the cases where the historical precedent was similar, 
which groups France and Iran as having precedent for high levels of violence and groups 
the United States and Russia as having precedent for little to no levels of violence. In 
each of these sets, the states were found to follow this precedent quite closely. These 
same groupings and findings can be attributed to the third aspect of socialization as the 
states viewed as legitimate had little to no violence and the illegitimate states had high 
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levels of violence. Therefore, I believe it can be stated that at least for the historical 
precedent and legitimacy aspects of socialization, a correlation can be seen. It is in the 
remaining aspect of socialization that my research is unfounded as no correlation is 
directly seen between the precedent of the state’s response and the level of political 
violence found in the state. Furthermore, the five external aspects discussed throughout 
my research shows that socialization is not the only factor in determining political 
violence. I conclude that although aspects of socialization have correlations to the level 
of political violence a state experiences, my research suggests that other factors also 
affect this result and that socialization is not the sole factor. 
Research Question 3: 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, scholars in this field often look to 
the structure of the state to determine the level of political violence that state expects, 
often stating that liberal democracies share little violence while authoritarian states 
experience high levels of violence. My thesis worked adjacent to this claim, instead 
looking to political culture and socialization to explain these disparities. With the results 
of my case studies, which represent two liberal democracies (The United States and 
France) and two authoritarian states (Iran and Russia), I can strongly claim that this is 
untrue. The level of violence between the United States and France is not equal despite 
their structural similarities and this is even more apparent across a comparison of Iran and 
Russia, despite their similarities in regime structure. Thus, the crowning achievement of 
my research is the validation of my claim that factors outside of government structure 
impact the level of political violence a state experiences.  
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Significance of My Research: 
 As discussed above, the questions I sought to answer at the beginning of my 
research have been dissected, researched, and answered. Through my research, I am able 
to dismiss the dominant belief that government structure can be used to determine the 
level of political violence in a state. Furthermore, my expectations that political culture 
alone would be better suited to determine why these disparities exists amongst state 
political violence was equally unfounded. The importance of my research and this thesis 
comes from the understanding of political violence that my research gives to comparative 
political theory. The disparate level of violence that states experience cannot be boiled 
down to the structure of the state nor can it be seen as only being linked to the political 
culture that a state falls into or the socialization aspects its citizens are exposed to. 
Instead, the political violence of a state is seemingly a mix of these elements. 
Socialization, political culture, demographics of a protest, government structure, and 
much more all impact the level of violence that we see across these protests. Whilst 
correlations can be observed in some of these aspects more clearly, it is obvious to me 
that no true causation can be stated. Fortunately, this will likely not be the last piece of 
political research ever written and the basis I have built in this research can be expounded 
upon to better flesh out what I have learned here about the causes of disparity in political 
violence. 
Future Research: 
 In my research, I came across a variety of issues that the planning stages of my 
research could not have anticipated and that which present an interesting field of study 
for future scholars. The aforementioned external aspects that affect political violence in 
protests are certainly not the only factors that exist. Exploration of these more nuanced 
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factors would further develop an understanding of political violence in comparative 
politics. Furthermore, my research was limited by time and by manpower. As discussed, 
a more fleshed out study would look at a more comprehensive group of cases, further 
expanding the list of models I have tested by altering the aspects of socialization within 
them. Doing this would test different countries, as matches would need to be found to 
accurately test these new models and would bring a stronger data pool than my research 
could provide. Finally, a deeper study might include patriotism as an aspect of 
socialization, a topic I considered heavily but was ultimately forced to drop from my own 
research. Our understanding of political violence and protest is very limited, but I hope 
that more studies like mine may provide a clearer image of these events and their origins. 
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